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Abstract—There has been an unprecedented surge in the
number of service providers offering a wide range of machine
learning prediction APIs for tasks such as image classification,
language translation, etc. thereby monetizing the underlying data
and trained models. Typically, a data owner (API provider)
develops a model, often over proprietary data, and leverages
the infrastructure services of a cloud vendor for hosting and
serving API requests. Clearly, this model assumes complete trust
between the API Provider and cloud vendor. On the other hand,
a malicious/buggy cloud vendor may copy the APIs and offer an
identical service, under-report model usage metrics, or unfairly
discriminate between different API providers by offering them a
nominal share of the revenue. In this work, we present the design
of a blockchain based decentralized trustless API marketplace
that enables all the stakeholders in the API ecosystem to audit
the behavior of the parties without having to trust a single
centralized entity. In particular, our system divides an AI model
into multiple pieces and deploys them among multiple cloud
vendors who then collaboratively execute the APIs. Our design
ensures that cloud vendors cannot collude with each other to
steal the combined model, while individual cloud vendors and
clients cannot repudiate their input or model executions.
Index Terms—Innovative use cases which leverage blockchain,
AI, Model inference, Software as a service API
I. INTRODUCTION
Last few years have witnessed a significant growth in cloud
based API marketplaces that offer a diverse collection of
software APIs on a pay-per-query basis [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7]. Commonly, these APIs expose valuable software
or business intelligence functions that application developers
can integrate with data and quickly compose and build rich
software applications. More recently, with the growth and
interest in building AI applications, most marketplaces offer a
large collection of pretrained prediction APIs. These APIs span
multiple domains such as social media, finance, healthcare,
education, and advertising and can help perform tasks such
as image tagging, face recognition, document classification,
speech recognition, and sentiment analysis. For instance, a
text analytics API may accept unstructured text data as input
and detect its language or offer language translation service. A
banking API may output a credit risk score given the historical
transaction data of a customer. A healthcare API may assess
the risk of cancer in a patient given the radiology data. The
Algorithmia marketplace [8] hosts a library of about 4, 500
such algorithm APIs while the Mashape marketplace (part of
RapidAPI) [2], [3] offers more than 10, 000 APIs.
The API marketplace ecosystem generally consists of three
stakeholders: a centralized cloud vendor, API providers, and
API consumers (i.e. application developers). The centralized
cloud vendor (e.g. Mashape, Algorithmia, etc.) hosts the APIs
developed by individual or small scale API providers and
manages the infrastructure and compute resources needed to
execute API query requests from consumers while guarantee-
ing security, availability, and low latency. The API providers
develop predictive or prescriptive models that are commer-
cially valuable and wrap these in the form of API contain-
ers [9] that are hosted on the cloud platform. These models
typically encompass proprietary knowledge regarding certain
processes or features, which when run on specific data can
produce output of economic value to end-users. Being part of a
marketplace helps individual and small scale API providers to
increase the accessibility and exposure of their APIs to a larger
customer base and avoid challenges pertaining to building and
hosting API portals. Lastly, the API consumers or application
developers access the hosted APIs typically on a pay-per-
query basis based on a subscription and pricing plan. The API
consumers benefit from the marketplace ecosystem by having
an increased choice and diversity of discoverable APIs and
pricing plans to meet their software development requirements,
thus lowering the overall cost of application development.
The revenue generated from API calls is shared between
the cloud vendor and the API providers. By connecting the
API providers and consumers, the marketplace enables all
three stakeholders to derive economic value from the joint
ecosystem.
Example. Consider a machine learning developer who trains
a language translation model and wishes to monetize it.
She therefore wraps her model within an API that accepts
unstructured text and target language as inputs and returns the
translated text. A developer generally lacks the infrastructure
to host and serve APIs at scale, and therefore chooses a
cloud vendor who hosts a centralized API marketplace (for
instance Algorithmia [8]), and deploys the API on the cloud.
In addition to hosting APIs, some cloud vendors also provide
automated services to convert ML models into APIs, which
minimizes an AI developer’s effort in monetizing her models.
A web developer, for example responsible for developing the
Wimbeldon website, integrates the API call via a translate
button on the webpage, enabling users from different countries
to view it. In this example, the web developer who is one of the
API consumers, pays the cloud vendor based on the number
of API calls per month. The cloud vendor in turn shares the
API revenue with the ML developer, who is the API provider.
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Fig. 1. API Marketplace Ecosystem with three stakeholders: A centralized
cloud vendor, API providers, and API consumers.
Despite providing numerous advantages, these centralized
API marketplaces face challenges related to fairness and trust
between all three stakeholders. More specifically,
• A malicious cloud vendor may copy a deployed API
including the associated confidential model supplied by
a provider and then offer a similar service. Moreover the
cloud vendor can invoke the API multiple times without
actually reporting it to the provider or report inaccurate
API usage metrics to increase its own share of the API
revenue.
• A malicious API provider may repudiate the query results
of a certain version of the deployed API or provide a
wrong API to begin with and repudiate that the output
has been generated by his API. The API provider may
also blame the cloud vendor for not executing an accurate
version of his API.
• A malicious API consumer may demand refund by claim-
ing that a wrong output was provided by the API service
by possibly forging its output. The API consumer may
first give wrong input data to the API and then claim
that the output was wrong by claiming to have provided
some other data as input.
In this work, we present the design of a blockchain enabled
decentralized API marketplace that ensures fair and trusted
usage of hosted APIs and averts malicious behavior of all
three stakeholders – cloud vendor, API provider, and API
consumer. The key novelty of the proposed solution lies in
the fact that instead of having one central cloud vendor store
and execute the confidential models encapsulated within an
API, our system splits the storage and execution of models
across multiple collaborating cloud vendors such that no single
vendor has full knowledge of the models invoked during an
API request. The system is designed to incentivize all three
stakeholders to record transactions related to their actions on
blockchain. All transactions related to the storage of models
components across cloud vendors, invocation of API request
by API consumers, execution of specific model components
held by individual cloud vendors, and receipt of the final
output by API consumers are stored on the Blockchain. The
system hosts smart contracts to automatically enforce correct
execution of functionality and provide evidence for dispute
resolution by a trusted arbitrator.
A. Related Work
A number of centralized and decentralized marketplaces
have emerged that provide different services related to training
and deploying machine learning (ML) models. These include
marketplaces based on rewards, that enable training of ML
models on data held by data owners, purchase of data assets,
and services to offer trained models as APIs.
Kaggle is an example of centralized machine learning
marketplace that connects data owners with machine learning
developers and rewards developers that submit a model with
the highest accuracy. The Danku protocol [10] by Algorithmia
offers a similar decentralized service, which uses blockchain.
Using a smart contract, the data owners publish their data
and an evaluation function on the blockchain. The developers
utilize this data and submit trained models that are automat-
ically tested using the evaluation function by miners on the
blockchain network to announce a winner.
The Skychain [11] project aims to connect owners of
medical data with AI developers and medical professionals
on blockchain. The project proposes the concept of proof
of deep learning training, which enables crypto miners to
contribute GPU compute resources for training neural network
models. Neureal is a similar effort [12] that allows idle
computing power to be commoditized and used for analyzing
big data, while rewarding miners for the accuracy of their
predictions. Similarly, Deepchain [13] attempts to achieve
privacy-preserving model training, wherein mistrustful par-
ties are given incentives to participate in federated learning
by sharing gradients and correctly updating parameters. The
Ocean protocol [14] is a blockchain based decentralized data
exchange protocol, which connects data owners with data
consumers (i.e. AI model developers). Owners can sell their
data multiple times in a secure and transparent manner and a
crowd based reputation system helps price the datasets in the
marketplace.
This work focuses on the deployment of trained models
as APIs. While a number of centralized API marketplaces
exist [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], there is no prior work on
blockchain based decentralized API marketplaces that connect
API providers, consumers, and cloud vendors. Moreover, none
of the existing marketplaces are based on the concept of
collaborative execution of trained models by multiple cloud
vendors. Additionally, unlike some of the existing work [11],
our work does not propose modifications to the underlying
blockchain protocols and can function over different types
of networks (e.g. Ethereum [15], [16] and Hyperledger fab-
ric [17]). Also, our work does not store API models on
blockchain, which may lead to loss of model privacy. Lastly,
our work is more broadly applicable to a large variety of
APIs that encapsulate different types of confidential models.
These models may simply execute software code, a mathe-
matical function, or invoke a trained ML models for inference
(e.g. a trained scikit-learn [18], Tensorflow [19], or PyTorch
model [20]).
Fig. 2. Blockchain enabled decentralized API Marketplace: API model invocations are split across multiple cloud vendors so that no single vendor has full
knowledge of the underlying API model. All transactions are recorded by participants on the distributed ledger. (Left) Regular approach without orchestrator,
(Right) Alternate Approach with orchestrator.
In the balance of the paper, we present the preliminary
design of our solution in section III and outline avenues for
future work in section IV.
II. DESIGN GOALS AND THREAT MODEL
The system should be able to protect the API provider
against a cloud vendor(s) trying to steal the model and host
an identical service as well as under-reporting of model usage
metrics. Similarly, the system should be able to protect honest
cloud vendors and API providers from malicious clients who
try to cheat by repudiating their inputs and outputs received
from the service. Our threat model assumes that cloud vendors
are rational and will try to collude with each other to steal the
model and host an identical service, as well as under-report
model usage statistics.
III. SOLUTION
We now present the design of a blockchain enabled trustless
API marketplace that averts malicious behavior of cloud
vendors, API providers, and API consumers.
A. Solution Design
At a high level, in our approach, the model encapsulated
within the API is split among multiple participating cloud
vendors (CV ) so that no single CV has full knowledge of
the deployed model (this is in principle similar to secret
sharing [21]). When the model API is invoked, it is internally
executed collaboratively by the respective cloud vendors who
successively transform the data to eventually yield the final
response to the prediction API. During each step of API
call, each participant stakeholder records their transactions on
blockchain based on the completed task.
B. Techniques to split API execution across multiple cloud
vendors
Depending on the type of code, software functions, or
models encapsulated within an API, its execution steps can
easily be split into multiple subcomponents across cloud
vendors using several techniques. We present a few techniques
that may be used with descriptive and predictive models.
1) Descriptive Models/Software functions: The code related
to general software functions or prescriptive models can easily
be partitioned into subcomponents so that each subcomponent
accepts processed data as input from a previous component,
makes new transformations to the data, and outputs it to the
next component for further processing. For instance, consider
an API commonly used by banks, which computes the credit
risk score of a customer based on historical transaction data. If
the risk score is computed using k metrics which are combined
together within a mathematical formula, then computation of
each metric can occur at an individual cloud vendor. The
computation of the overall formula can also be hierarchically
partitioned among a few cloud vendors so that none of them
have knowledge of the mathematical formula, which may be
confidential. In this manner each cloud vendor is exposed to
only a small portion of the overall computation and does not
gain the know how to compute the credit risk score.
2) Predictive Machine Learning Models: When an API en-
capsulates machine learning models, the split of computation
for model inference can occur at multiple cloud vendors as
follows. For neural network models, each layer or a stack
of layers may reside on a cloud vendor, so that the forward
propagation step needed for model inference may be executed
successively by each cloud vendor and no individual vendor
has full knowledge of the neural network model. For decision
tree models, each node or a subtree corresponding to the model
can reside at a separate cloud vendor, effectively connecting
invocations of cloud vendors within a tree structure. Most
AI models that yield high accuracy are essentially ensemble
models such as random forest, gradient boosted trees, or
an ensemble of different models such as SVMs and Neural
networks. In such scenarios, each individual model is weak
and the ensemble essentially combines several weak models
to obtain a stronger model. In this setting, each weak model
or a group of weak models may reside on a cloud vendor.
In the proposed alternate approach wherein an orchestrator
invokes a different subset of cloud vendors on each API call,
a set of weaker models may be placed at each cloud vendor.
The compute step of combining results of multiple models
obtained from different vendors (e.g. via any mathematical
function such as averaging) can also be split across multiple
cloud vendors.
C. Transactions recorded on blockchain
Handshake/Model Distribution and Deployment. Off-chain,
an API provider decomposes the model M encapsulated
within the API into n subcomponents and containerizes these,
effectively yielding n sub-APIs S1,..Sn. The provider then
enters into individual offline agreements with n cloud vendors
and deploys each sub-component Si onto a separate cloud
vendor. After decomposition, the provider computes a unique
API model signature, for instance the Merkle root [22] of the
subcomponents, such that signature(M) = signature(S1..Sn).
This model signature is then recorded on the blockchain by
the provider. For each participant p, let v(p) denote its virtual
ID on the blockchain. Thus the API provider knows both real
off-chain identities and the virtual identities v(CVi) ∀i that
hold its model. However no two CV s that both hold parts
of a particular model M know each other’s real off-chain
identities. In addition to the model signature, the provider
records on the blockchain the API id id(M) and the sequence
v(CV1), ..., v(CVn) in which the subAPIs must be executed
by each cloud vendor for an API invocation.
API Request Execution. When an API consumer invokes
the API id(M) with a user input I , the consumer registers
(id(M), I) on the blockchain, which notifies all the CV s that
hold parts of the model M . Thus the cloud vendor v(CV1)
picks up the input I1 = I from blockchain, executes S1 and
obtains the output O1. It then records (D1, O1, hash(S1))
on the blockchain. The next cloud vendor in the sequence
declared by the provider, v(CV2) then picks up the input
I2 = O1 from the blockchain and repeats the process. The
API consumer waits for the cloud vendor v(CVn) to place its
output On on the blockchain and eventually picks it up as the
final output O = On of the API id(M). Figure 2(left) presents
a schematic of the approach.
Dispute Resolution. Smart Contracts are used to ensure the
completeness and correctness of execution of sub-components.
They can be used to verify the sequence of operations through
hash-matches and ensure all S1..Sn are executed and also
verify that each cloud vendor runs the right code for its
component through hash-match with Si provided by model
owner.
D. Alternate approach with orchestrator
The previous approach has two drawbacks: (a) the order
of execution by cloud vendors remains same across multiple
invocations of an API, which can pose risks related to collu-
sion and (b) the blockchain holds input and output data from
intermediate sub-APIs which introduces risks related to reverse
engineering of sub-components over time.
We now propose an alternate approach (Figure 2(right)), in
which K sub-components of a model are stored with overlap
across cloud vendors, so that only a subset of V ⊆ N CV s are
required to invoke a model. In this case, the order and subset
of cloud vendors may be chosen randomly for each API call.
In addition to the CV s, this approach requires the use of an
orchestrator who choses a random set of CVs to invoke for
each API call. Additionally, the orchestrator passes the input
and output data back and forth between the CVs, so that each
CVi (and the orchestrator) records the hash of the input and
output data rather than the actual data itself on blockchain i.e.
(hash(Di), hash(Oi), hash(Si)). This approach requires that
the orchestrator know the actual off-chain identities (e.g. IP or
http address) of the CVs in order to invoke the sub-APIs. The
API consumer essentially writes a hash of the input I and the
final output O on the blockchain and passes the actual input to
the orchestrator and also receives the actual final API output
from it.
E. Collaboration between multiple API providers.
One of the advantages of the proposed system is that it
allows multiple API providers to collaborate together in a
trustless setting and offer a joint API without revealing the
underlying models to one another. In the previous sections, we
considered the setting of an individual API provider who splits
the model execution across multiple cloud vendors. However,
in practice, different enterprises may want to collaborate in a
trustless setting and each build a small component of a larger
API and finally monetize the model. For example, a banking
firm and an insurance firm may come together to offer a joint
API to classify customers for advertising. In this case, both
parties use the proposed system to offer a combined API and
share revenue from its use in a trustless setting.
F. Security Analysis
In comparison to centralized marketplaces, the proposed
system is resilient against malicious behavior from all three
stakeholders.
• Malicious behavior by cloud vendors. Since no single
CV has access to the full model, any malicious CV
cannot copy the deployed model supplied by the model
owner and offer a similar service or invoke the model
multiple times without reporting to the model owner.
Additionally, inaccurate API metrics cannot be reported
to API providers as this information is recorded in
an immutable ledger. Moreover since cloud vendors do
not know each other’s off-chain identities, they cannot
easily collude to offer a similar service outside of the
marketplace.
• Malicious behavior by API providers. Since blockchain
holds evidence of the initial split of model across CVs
and the specific modules invoked by each CV along with
input and output data, a malicious API provider cannot
backtrack or deny the query results of a certain version of
the deployed model or provide wrong model to begin with
and repudiate that the output has been generated by his
model. Additionally, the API provider cannot blame CVs
for running inaccurate version of the model components.
• Malicious behavior by API consumers. Since the
blockchain stores evidence of data supplied to the API
and to individual model components held by each CV
as well as components invoked by each CV, a malicious
buyer cannot demand refund by claiming that a wrong
output was provided by the service (using a forged
output).
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Subscription-driven software licensing mechanisms,
wherein providers host software-as-a-service APIs in a cloud
environment and get paid on a pay-per-query basis, is now a
common approach to monetizing software. Commonly, these
APIs encapsulate confidential and commercially valuable
software functions, business intelligence logic or trained
machine learning models, which application developers can
integrate with data to build software applications. However
centralized API marketplaces face challenges related to
fairness and trust between all three stakeholders – cloud
Vendors, API providers, and API consumers. Cloud vendors
may copy the hosted API models and offer a similar service,
thereby diminishing the revenue of API providers. The API
providers may backtrack or deny the query results of the
deployed API while consumers may demand refund by
claiming that a wrong output was provided by the API by
potentially forging the output.
In this work, we presented the design of a blockchain based
decentralized API marketplace that allows all stakeholders to
work together in a trustless setting without the need for a
trusted central entity. The key novelty of our work is that
instead of having one central cloud vendor store and execute
the confidential models encapsulated within APIs, our system
splits the execution of models across multiple cloud vendors
such that no single vendor gains full knowledge of the models
invoked within the APIs. All stakeholder records their actions
on the distributed ledger, so that the system averts malicious
behavior and provides evidence of dispute resolution by a
trusted arbitrator.
Future work will implement our system on different
blockchain networks (e.g. Ethereum and hyperledger fabric)
with the help of chaincode functions and smart contracts
as well as study risks related to collusion among partici-
pants. An important direction for further investigation is to
experimentally compare the performance of centralized API
marketplaces with decentralized ones that incur additional
costs of recording transactions on the distributed ledger.
Another direction is to perform a comparative study of the
performance of the proposed system as well as its advantages
and disadvantages with techniques that encrypt the hosted
API models in order to maintain their confidentiality [23].
Lastly, secure execution of code and its formal verifiability (as
required by each cloud vendor in our solution) is an important
area of further study [24].
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